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Negligent Design of Sports Facilities
Bernard Mandel*
WVHAT DUTY OF CARE is owed to participants in sports by the owners
Vand/or operators of sports facilities, with regard to the design
of these facilities? What risks does the participant assume? Does a
jockey assume the risk of being injured by striking an improperly de-
signed railing when thrown from his' horse? Does a basketball player
assume the risk of injury caused by running into a wall in close prox-
imity to the end of the court?
The above situations are illustrative of perplexing questions in this
area of the law of Torts. The scope of this note is limited to the design
of sports facilities and the duties of owners and participants relative
thereto. Faulty construction and faulty maintenance of the facilities are
not within its purview.
Generally, a participant in a sports event, game or contest assumes
only those risks and dangers inherent in that particular game. The
participant does not assume the risk of injury resulting from the neg-
ligence of the owner or operator of the facility used, although he may
be precluded from recovery if he was contributorily negligent,' or if
the defect was patent and he assumed the patent risks of such dangers.2
There is an apparent trend toward broadening the definition of dangers
inherent in a particular sport; these now seem to include not only the
dangers of the sport, but also the dangers inherent in the particular
facility necessarily used.3
For What Is the Participant Accountable?
A participant in a sport accepts all normal risks inherent in that
sport. For instance, in the game of golf, it is reasonable to expect that
someone may be hit by a driven golf ball. In Campion v. Chicago Land-
scape Co.,4 an expert testified that he was not aware of a golf course
where it would not be possible for someone to slice or hook a ball into
another fairway. This is one of the hazards of all golf courses, with
which golf players are familiar. But the mere proximity of fairways
* B.B.A., Western Reserve Univ.; Pension Administrator for Eaton, Yale & Towne,
Inc.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace
College.
1 Annot., 7 A. L. R. 2d at 706 (1949); Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club, 240 N. C. 159,
81 S. E. 2d 375 (1954).
2 Paine v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 91 N. H. 78, 13 A. 2d 820 (1940).
3 Maltz v. Board of Education of New York City, 32 Misc. 2d 492, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 856
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
4 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d 879 (1938).
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without barriers does not subject a golfer to risks over and above those
recognized as inherent in the game. 5
Each sport has its own set of risks or dangers. Users of downhill
winter sports facilities, such as skiers, sledders or tobogganers, assume
the risks inherent in the nature of the snow and the fact that it may
conceal dangerous terrain.0 In horse racing, jockeys are subject to the
risk of being thrown from their mounts onto the railing.
7
The general rule, with regard to participants assuming risks in-
herent in a particular sport, has been expanded to include also the
patent risks of playing the sport on a specific facility. For instance, a
basketball player who was carried into a wall beyond the end of the
court by his momentum, was barred from recovery because the prox-
imity of the wall to the basket was an obvious risk necessary to the
sport as played on this particular court.8 In a baseball game an out-
fielder who ran into a steel cable which had been constructed to re-
strain spectators could not recover for his resulting injury.9 A par-
ticipant in a softball game, who was injured when he tripped on a
cement curbing, around an area originally designed for skating but
subsequently used also for softball, could not recover damages because
the risks of injury as a result of the curbing and adjacent benches were
obvious and necessary to the sport as played on that particular field. 10
It is interesting to note that while each sport has its set of inherent
dangers, the list is a basic one to which one should add any dangers
which are obvious because of the interaction of the design of the facility
used with the normal action of the sport, with which one must assume
the participant to be familiar. Thus, although the cable on a baseball
field, as in the case above," is not a risk normally inherent in a game
of baseball, it becomes so where the plaintiff is aware of its existence
and of the possibility of his running into it during the course of the game.
5 Hornstein v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 486, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 902 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Trauman v.
City of New York, 208 Misc. 252, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also,
Walsh v. Machlin, 128 Conn. 412, 23 A. 2d 156 (1941); Houston v. Escott, 85 F. Supp.
59 (C. C. Del. 1949); Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 A. 10 (1931); 21
Temp. L. Q. 288 (1948); Petrich v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn., 188
So. 199 (La. App. 1939); Johnston v. Blanchard, 301 N. Y. 599, 93 N. E. 2d 494 (1950);
Rocchio v. Frers, 248 App. Div. 786, 290 N. Y. S. 432 (1936).
6 Annot., 94 A. L. R. 2d 1432 (1964); Kaufman v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 56, 172 N. Y. S.
2d 276 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786 (C. C. Vt.
1951); Broderson v. Rainier Nat'l. Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P. 2d 234 (1936); Van
Der Veen v. United States, 349 F. 2d 583 (9th Cir. 1965).
7 Cole v. N. Y. Racing Assn., 24 App. Div. 2d 933, 266 N. Y. S. 2d 267 (1965).
s Maltz v. Board of Education of New York City, supra n. 3.
9 Kubitz v. City of Sandusky, 176 Ohio St. 445, 200 N. E. 2d 322 (1964).
10 Scala v. City of New York, 200 Misc. 475, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
11 Kubitz v. City of Sandusky, supra n. 9.
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DESIGN OF SPORTS FACILITIES
For What Is the Owner or Operator of the Sports Facilities
Accountable?
The owners and/or operators of the sports facilities are charged
with the responsibility of providing facilities properly designed and
safely constructed for the use for which they are intended. The major
question posed is that of the standards to be used in the design. A man
is not necessarily obliged to conduct his business in the same manner
as another man; however, if there is a custom in the trade, or where
certain dangers have been removed by a customary manner of doing
things, the custom may be shown to prove failure to meet a required
standard.1 2 It has been held that a general usage may be shown in order
to establish a standard of construction, and that where there is a ques-
tion of negligence, the general usage may be shown to demonstrate
failure to meet a required standard of care.' 3 It must be remembered,
however, that a person does not necessarily have the obligation to use
the best methods, nor must he employ the best equipment, nor even
supply the safest place for the use intended. It is only necessary that
he use or provide those which are reasonably safe for the intended
use.
14
A novice skier was injured when she was struck from behind by a
sled coming down a run adjacent to the ski slope. The two slopes were
separated for the first 40 feet, after which there was no barrier or
obstruction to keep sledders and skiers from crossing each other's paths.
Expert testimony demonstrated that there was an accepted standard of
care recognized, wherein sledding and skiing should not be permitted
together, because to do so would create added dangers which were not
inherent in each sport individually. The court, in holding for the plain-
tiff skier, found that the ski and sled slopes were negligently designed.15
In a recent case, a jockey was killed when he was thrown from his
horse and struck his head on a concrete footing of a post supporting the
railing. The footing protruded three to five inches above ground level.
Such elevated footings were non-existent at any other race track in
the country. Here the footings had been raised in order to retard the
corrosion of the metal posts, although at other race tracks it was cus-
tomary to have these footings at, or below, ground level. Prior to this
fatal accident, a number of other riders had been thrown without any
serious injuries as a result of these footings, and these spills should
have put the race track owners on notice that the raised footings were
12 Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N. Y. 290, 190 N. E. 643 (1934).
13 Annot., 94 A. L. R. 2d 1432 (1964); Welo v. Union News Co., 263 App. Div. 328, 32
N. Y. S. 2d 943 (1942).
14 Bennett v. Long Island R. R. Co., 163 N. Y. 1, 57 N. E. 79 (1900); Miele v. Rosen-
blatt, 164 App. Div. 604, 150 N. Y. S. 323 (1914).
15 Morse v. State, 262 App. Div. 324, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1941).
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an added peril to riders. It was held that this design was a negligent
deviation from the customary standards and was the proximate cause
of the death of the jockey. 1
Negligent design of a sports facility in and of itself is not always
sufficient to result in a judgment for the injured participant. It must be
shown that the negligence in design was the proximate cause of the in-
jury. In the sport of golf, it has been held that it is virtually impossible
to design a course so that at every point one cannot be hit by a ball from
another fairway. 17 An injured golfer alleged that to design a nine-hole
course on thirty acres of land was negligence per se, and in fact a
recognized golf course architect testified that considerably more acreage
should have been used. It was held, however, that the design of the
golf course was not the proximate cause of the injury.
Where there is a deviation from standard design it must be such
that the danger should have been obvious to the owner or operator.' 8
Where a bowler was injured when he caught his foot in a two-inch
space between the ball return and floor, judgment was rendered for the
bowling proprietor. It was found that this type of construction was
standard, except that the space was % of an inch higher. Some alleys
had closed off the space. Prior to this accident, hundreds of thousands
of games were bowled without incident. While the owner had a duty
to provide a safe place, the court felt that he could not be charged with
the breach of a duty to avoid a danger which he did not know existed. 19
In another case an ice skater was injured when she tripped as
her skate struck a wooden ledge when she reached for a handrail. 20
An expert testified that the handrail should have been placed at the
very edge of the skating area. This deviation from standard design im-
posed an obvious and unnecessary risk upon the skater, and the court
found against the rink operator.
In a case where a roller skater was injured when he slipped and
fell through a window, the actions of the operator of the rink made
it obvious that he was aware of a defective design, and the court held
16 Cole v. New York Racing Assn., supra n. 7.
17 Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d 879 (1938).
18 Restatement (2d), Torts § 343 (1966) speaks of the liability of possessors of land
as to injuries sustained by invitees. The statement of principle is applicable to op-
erators and/or owners of sports facilities.
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail
to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
19 Sykes v. Bensinger Recreation Corp., 117 F. 2d 964 (7th Cir. 1941).
20 Welo v. Union News Co., supra n. 13.
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that he did not use reasonable care in protecting the skaters. 21 Here
there were two windows adjacent to the rink; one was protected by an
iron grating, and the other had a bench placed under it in an attempt
to protect skaters. It was clear that the design should have provided
for protection of both windows with a grating, and it was thus reason-
able to assume skaters would lose their balance, and therefore the
danger of an unguarded window was also obvious.
While an owner must have known, or should have known, that
his deviation from standard design presented a danger not inherent in
the sport, the courts now charge him with a further duty; he must
be able to anticipate the normal actions of the participant of the sport.
A bowler was assigned the last alley in a bowling establishment. Paral-
lel to and lower than the alley was a walk presenting a danger obvious
to the bowler. After delivering his ball, the bowler turned and walked
back, looking over his shoulder at the pins. He stepped off the edge
of the alley and fell, causing his injury. It was held that what may be
perfectly obvious to a person walking normally is likely to be forgotten
by a contestant in the excitement of a game. The construction of the
alley in this manner was in no way necessary to bowling as a sport.22
This decision was contrary to that previously rendered in Scala v.
City of New York,2 3 where a softball player fell on a cement curb
around an area designed for skating, but used also for softball. Here
the player claimed that in the heat of the game he temporarily forgot
the obvious hazard of the curbing and was, therefore, not guilty of con-
tributory negligence. On this point, however, it was held that momen-
tary forgetfulness of the danger was one of the risks he had assumed.
While an operator must anticipate the actions of a participant, he
cannot be required to foresee every possible accident.2 4 A skater left
a roller skating area and skated over to a spectator area, where she
tripped and fell through a window. The court held that while it is to be
expected that skaters will fall, it was unreasonable to expect the op-
erator to foresee a skater leaving the skating area and crossing a lobby.
Where the defect in design is latent, the owner or operator owes the
participant the duty of being able to reasonably rely on the safe con-
struction of the facility. We have seen that in a basketball game the
participant assumed the risk of running into a wall or door jamb.23
In another recent basketball case a player ran into a door in the wall
under the basket and was injured when the window in the door
shattered. While the player assumed the risk of running into the door,
21 Fieger v. Imperial Skating Rink, 148 Ore. 137, 35 P. 2d 683 (1934).
22 Murphy v. El Dorado Bowl, Inc., 2 Ariz. App. 341, 409 P. 2d 57 (1965).
23 Supra n. 10.
24 Bryant v. Ludendi Roller Drome, Inc., 150 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 1963).
25 Maltz v. Board of Education of New York City, supra n. 3.
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he did not assume the risk that the window panel would be of ordinary
glass. He could reasonably have assumed that because of the proximity
of the glass panel to the basket, it would be of such construction as to
be resistant to impact. 26
A swimmer dived from a dock into two and one-half feet of water,
with resulting injury. The court ruled that while the swimming area
operator was not an insurer of the swimmers, he was bound to pro-
vide a reasonably safe place for the intended use. A patron of a public
swimming pool has a right to rely upon the assumption that the pro-
prietor has provided a place that is reasonably safe for use in the
manner for which it was apparently designed and to which in fact
it had been adopted. 27
Where a baseball field was designed so that the outfield contained
holes which were concealed from view by grass, the owner was held
liable for the injury of a baseball player who tripped.28 There was a
latent defect; the player had a right to believe that the field was safe
for the anticipated use.
What Defenses Are Available to Owners of Sports Facilities?
Where it has been alleged that there was negligent design of a
sports facility, the defendant owners or operators usually have relied
for a defense on the doctrine of assumption of the risk, or the partici-
pant's contributory negligence.
In Maltz v. Board of Education,29 a basketball player was injured
when he ran into a door jamb positioned almost directly behind the
basket. The player previously had gone through the opened door
unharmed, and thus was aware of the hazards and voluntarily assumed
the necessary and obvious dangers here. It was held that the risks
were obvious and necessary to the sport as played on this particular
court.
With regard to the issue of assumption of risk, it must be remem-
bered that, in addition to knowledge of the physical defect, an essen-
tial requisite is a reasonable appreciation of all the dangers produced by
the physical condition.30 A successful application of the doctrine does
not absolve the operator from liability, but does change the applicable
standards and raises the degree of care owed by the injured person for
26 Stevens v. Central School Dist. No. 1 Town of Ramapo, 25 App. Div. 2d 871, 270
N. Y. S. 2d 23 (1966).
27 Hanson v. Christensen, 145 N. W. 2d 868 (Minn. 1966).
28 Scherz v. Salon, 26 App. Div. 2d 691, 272 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (1966).
29 Maltz v. Board of Education of New York City, supra n. 3.
30 McEvoy v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (1948); Beck v.
Monmouth Lumber Co., 137 N. J. L. 268, 59 A. 2d 400 (1948); Larson v Nassau Elec-
tric R. R. Co., 223 N. Y. 14, 119 N. E. 92 (1918).
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his own safety.3 1 Where a basketball player was injured by glass shat-
tering as he impacted with a door in which a window was mounted,
it was held that non-shatterproof glass was not an assumed risk, since
the injured player was unappreciative of the danger produced by the
use of ordinary window glass.3 2
The dangers in a poorly-designed facility must be obvious in order
to present a valid defense. In a basketball accident, a participant in a
game fell on some bleachers adjacent to the wall of the gymnasium. He
had been an observer of the first half of the game and had an oppor-
tunity to become cognizant of the risks the bleachers presented to a
player. It was held that he encountered a known danger, thereby pre-
cluding his recovery.3 3
In the Scala case, 34 where a participant in a softball game fell over
a concrete curbing, it was held that the risks were obvious and neces-
sary to the sport as played on that particular field. The injured player
had played there many times and he voluntarily assumed this danger.
The opinion went on to say that "one who takes part in a sport accepts
the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary,
just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his opponent." Where
the outfielder ran into the clearly visible steel cable constructed around
the baseball field for the purpose of restraining spectators, the danger
was held to be quite obvious. The player had assumed this risk.35 In
a softball game a player tripped over a hole and suffered a broken
leg. The hole was clearly visible, and it was held that while the field
was poorly designed, the condition was patent and the danger obvious
to the player. The player had an obligation to use reasonable care
for his own safety.3 6
This does not mean that every patent defect gives rise to a valid
defense of assumption of risks; it is only one necessary factor. This is
exemplified in the bowling case where the bowler stepped off the alley
and fell. Here it was held that while the danger was perfectly obvious,
31 Schlief v. Grigsby, 88 Cal. App. 174, 263 P. 255 (1927); Graff v. United R. R., 178
Cal. 171, 172 P. 603 (1918).
32 Stevens v. Central School Dist. No. 1 Town of Ramapo, supra n. 26.
33 Paine v. Young Men's Christian Assn., supra n. 2; In Robinson v. Boston & M.
R. R., 85 N. H. 474, 160 A. 473 (1932), although the case involved a train injury, the
same principle, of obvious dangers, was involved. It was shown that the injured
party was aware of the dangers and should have exercised care. The court said
"The duty to give attention to one's safety in a position of obvious danger is im-
posed because the ordinary man gives that attention. A plaintiff may not say that he
was not required to give attention because of other considerations. It is not careful
conduct to pay no heed to the demands of safety."
34 Scala v. City of New York, supra n. 10.
35 Kubitz v. City of Sandusky, supra n. 9.
36 Luftig v. Steinhorn, 21 App. Div. 2d 760, 250 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (1964).
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it was reasonable to expect that a bowler may have forgotten the con-
dition in the heat of the game.37
Another element apparently required for successful use of as-
sumption of the risk as a defense is that the deviation from the standard,
or the design used, was justified, or necessary, to the sport as played
on those particular facilities. In the bowling case mentioned above,3 S
there was no factor connected with the sport which required the alley to
be constructed as it was. Where the baseball player ran into the re-
straining steel cable it was held that the cable had been constructed
and positioned for a valid purpose: the protection and restraint of spec-
tators who might otherwise venture onto the playing area, subjecting
themselves to injury by being struck by a ball.39
Another often-used defense is that of contributory negligence. This
is negligence, or lack of due care, on the part of the injured person
which, alone or together with the negligence of the defendant, was a
proximate cause of the injury.40 This defense becomes important where
the deviation from standards is not negligent per se.
Where a golfer chose not to walk on a path and was injured when
he stepped into a vertical pipe which was housing a sprinkler, it was
held that the location of the watering system was not part of the terrain
provided for playing golf. The golfer's recovery was precluded by his
contributory negligence in straying from the path.4 1
Where the negligent design of a sports facility is in issue, it must
be shown that, despite the design of the facility, the participant's con-
tributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Generally
there is no contributory negligence if an injury would have occurred de-
spite any action of the injured party.42
Summary
Successful litigation of an injury caused by negligent design of a
sports facility hinges upon the plaintiff's demonstrating that the design
of the facility deviated from standards in a negligent manner, and was
the proximate cause of the injury. In addition, it must be shown that
deviation from the norm is a danger to the participant which should
have been anticipated by the owner or operator. The deviation can-
not be justifiable or necessary to the sport as played in or on this
particular facility. If the defect is latent, it must be shown that the in-
37 Murphy v. El Dorado Bow], Inc., supra n. 22.
38 Ibid.
39 Kubitz v. City of Sandusky, supra n. 9.
40 Garaglio v. Frontier Power Co., 1962 F. 2d 175 (10th Cir. 1951); Saindon v. Lucero,
187 F. 2d 345 (10th Cir. 1951).
41 Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club, supra n. 1.
42 James v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co., 92 N. J. L. 149, 104 A. 328 (1918).
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jured participant reasonably relied on the facility being safe for the
purpose for which it was designed.
An owner or operator of a sports facilities, the design of which was
alleged to be the proximate cause of injuries, must show that the design
was neither negligent nor a deviation from accepted standards or cus-
tomary usage. It must be demonstrated that the injury was a result of a
danger inherent in the sport. It may further be shown that the condition
from which the injury arose was a danger which was inherent in the
sport as played on that particular facility. Even assuming that there
is a deviation from standard design, an effective defense can be in-
terposed if the deviation was warranted and necessary to the sport as
played there. However, as a corollary to this defense, the injured par-
ticipant must have been aware of the danger and must therefore have
assumed the risk. Finally, the contributory negligence of the par-
ticipant will generally preclude his recovery despite any improper
design of the facility.
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